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for the technical  issues  of dynamic 
models  of policy  as a function of 
opinion-and  particularly those  in- 
volved  in separating linkage 
through elections  from linkage by 
our direct rational anticipation sce- 
nario-prevent  more than a cursory 
look. 
We take that cursory look in Fig- 
ure 5, where we  present summary 
series  for Senate,  House,  and presi- 
dency,  along with policy  mood,  our 
global public opinion measure 
(lagged one year to keep our causal 
story straight). They go together. 
That can be seen by eyeballing  and 
confirmed by simple product mo- 
ment correlations  (.47,  .39, and .54 
for Senate,  House,  and president). 
It isn't the last we'll  have to say on 
the issue. 
We conclude  that our data are 
consistent  with a global view  of 
opinion and policy.  General shifts 
of opinion over time seem  con- 
nected with general shifts of policy 
activity.  The structure has logic in 
theory and empirical support. 
Clearly, however,  it does  not rule 
out alternatives.  We think it is a 
plausible story for representation  in 
the long run. But something  differ- 
ent was  going on,  for example, 
when  the new Clinton Administra- 
tion abandoned nominees  in the 
face of telephone  and fax assaults. 
What these  data begin to suggest 
is representation of a longitudinal 
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What these  data begin to suggest 
is representation of a longitudinal 
sort, that we  can tell a coherent 
story of citizens  altering their basic 
dispositions  toward government, 
and government  then responding. 
What is satisfying  about this global 
view  is both that it works  and that 
it works without  heroic assump- 
tions about the level  of awareness 
and involvement  of ordinary citi- 
zens.  It works,  that is, with the 
public opinion we  know. 
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1.  This focus  on anticipation as the quint- 
essential  behavior of elected  politicians  has 
much commonality  with Arnold's  (1990) 
statement  about the congressional  part of 
government. 
2.  The case  may be put negatively  as 
well.  Conservatives  who  once  adopted mod- 
eration for self-protection  would  no longer 
feel the need to do so. 
3.  The estimates  are central tendencies  of 
all available survey  marginals for policy 
preference  questions  asked in identical for- 
mat over  time. The estimation  technology 
(see  Stimson  1991) has a logic akin to that of 
principal components  analysis,  and thus the 
estimates  may be thought of as something 
like factor scores. 
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Scholars  who  study the connec- 
tions between  public opinion and 
the policy  process,  and politicians 
who  engage in making those  con- 
nections,  face the same two prob- 
lems.  First,  determining what opin- 
ion the public actually holds is 
much more of an interpretive than 
a methodological  exercise.  Second, 
designing policies  to respond to 
that (presumed) opinion is at best 
an inexact  art and at worst  a dem- 
onstration that making the wrong 
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moves  can produce more harm 
than good.  This essay  illustrates 
these  points by examining race pol- 
itics in America over the past three 
decades. 
In order to move  quickly to 
those  illustrations,  let me stipulate, 
with minimal evidence,  several 
starting points.  First, middle-class 
African Americans  are better off 
now than middle-class  members of 
their race have ever been; well-off 
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richer at a faster rate than well-off 
white  Americans  (though from a 
lower absolute  starting point); and 
middle-class  African Americans  are 
gaining ground at the same time 
that poor African Americans  are 
losing it. 
Those  points require much evi- 
dence  to be completely  persuasive, 
but they are all illustrated by a sim- 
ple comparison of income  quantiles 
by race over time (see Table  1). 
Second,  the "American  dream" 
richer at a faster rate than well-off 
white  Americans  (though from a 
lower absolute  starting point); and 
middle-class  African Americans  are 
gaining ground at the same time 
that poor African Americans  are 
losing it. 
Those  points require much evi- 
dence  to be completely  persuasive, 
but they are all illustrated by a sim- 
ple comparison of income  quantiles 
by race over time (see Table  1). 
Second,  the "American  dream" 
March  1994  March  1994  35  35 Symposium 
TABLE 1 
Percent Share of Families' Aggregate Income Held by Wealthy and 
Poor of Each Race, 1947-1991 
1947  1967  1987  1991 
Nonwhite  White  Black  White  Black  White  Black  White 
poorest 40%: 
14.7  17.7  15.0  18.3  11.9  16.3  11.6  16.0 
wealthiest  40%: 
69.1  65.4  68.6  64.2  72.6  66.9  72.8  67.2 
Source:  U.S.  Bureau of the Census.  Money Income  of Households,  Families,  and Persons 
in the  United States,  1987 and 1991. 
is the dominant political ideology  of 
the United  States.  The ideology  has 
four related but distinct tenets. 
They answer the questions:  Who 
may pursue the American dream? 
In what does  the pursuit consist? 
How  does  one  successfully  pursue 
the dream? Why is the pursuit wor- 
thy of our deepest  commitment? 
The answer to "who?"  is "every- 
one,  regardless of ascriptive traits, 
family background, or personal 
history."  The answer to "what?" 
is "the  reasonable  anticipation, 
though not the promise,  of suc- 
cess."  The answer to "how?"  is 
"through actions  and traits under 
one's  own control."  The answer to 
"why?"  is "true success  is associ- 
ated with virtue." 
Third, despite  their increasing 
material success,  middle-class 
blacks believe  in the American 
dream less  now than their counter- 
parts did 30 years  ago. Their 
sharply declining belief contrasts 
with poor blacks'  much milder de- 
cline in belief in the American 
dream. (Middle-class whites  have 
also lost  some faith in the dream, 
but not nearly as much as middle- 
class blacks.) 
A few examples  of survey  data 
must stand in here for a sustained 
demonstration of this claim.  On the 
first tenet of the American dream, 
middle-class  blacks were  more opti- 
mistic than poor blacks in the 
1960s, but less  so in the 1980s. 
Asked  in 1968 "if a young  Negro 
works hard enough,  . . . [can] he or 
she usually get ahead in this coun- 
try in spite of prejudice and dis- 
crimination?,"  7% more well-edu- 
cated than poorly educated blacks 
answered in the affirmative. But 
asked in 1988 if "blacks  have the 
same opportunities  to live a middle 
class  life as whites?,"  26% more 
poorly educated  than well-educated 
blacks said "yes."' 
The same pattern holds for the 
second  tenet.  Three decades  ago, 
middle-class  blacks were  more opti- 
mistic than poor blacks.  They be- 
came less  so over time since  their 
belief in the American dream de- 
clined so sharply. In 1971, 17% 
more high- than low-income  Afri- 
can Americans  claimed to be "sat- 
isfied . . . with the future facing 
you  and your family."  But 15 years 
later, 36% more poor than well-off 
blacks felt that "looking  to the fu- 
ture,  . . . the American  Dream will 
be easier to attain than today.'2 
The pattern holds less  sharply for 
the third tenet.  Well-off blacks  are 
always less  likely than are poor 
blacks to hold members of their 
race responsible  for their own situ- 
ation (i.e.,  well-off  blacks  are less 
likely to accept  the claim of the 
ideology),  but they were  more criti- 
cal of their fellow  blacks  in the 
1960s than in the 1980s (i.e.,  they 
came closer  to accepting  the claim 
of the ideology). 
We have too few survey  ques- 
tions on the fourth tenet,  about the 
worthiness  of the pursuit, to be 
confident of any trends over time. 
The fourth and final stipulation 
gives  more precision  to what mid- 
dle-class  African Americans  mean 
by their declining faith in the 
American dream. They,  like all 
other groups of Americans,  still 
overwhelmingly  endorse  our domi- 
nant ideology  as a prescription  for 
American life.  But their faith in the 
American dream as a description  is 
declining. 
For example,  virtually all Ameri- 
cans agree that everyone  in the 
United  States warrants equal edu- 
cational opportunities.  More point- 
edly,  no more than 10% of middle- 
class  blacks embrace views  posed 
as alternatives to the American 
dream such as Afrocentrism,  at 
least in surveys.  Furthermore,  a 
strong majority continue  to believe, 
as do well-off whites  but not the 
poor of any race, that their own 
future looks  bright and that they 
are in control of their lives. 
What middle-class  blacks  are in- 
creasingly  skeptical  about, more 
than are other groups,  is the ability 
of their children, other members of 
their race,  and sometimes  all other 
citizens  of the nation to realize the 
American dream in their lives. 
Thus in the eyes  of well-off  African 
Americans,  the American dream 
reigns as prescription,  rules as de- 
scription of one's  own life,  and in- 
creasingly  falters as a description 
of others'  lives. 
Let us,  for the sake of argument 
here, put aside concerns  about the 
dangers of relying on single ques- 
tions,  of comparing questions  with 
different wording over time,  and of 
the poor sampling procedures 
among African Americans  in the 
1960s. (It is reassuring that other 
survey  questions  show  the same 
pattern, and that qualitative evi- 
dence  of many kinds supports the 
claims here.  Documentation  is in 
my forthcoming book, Race,  Class, 
and the American  Dream.)  My 
concern  in this essay  is the connec- 
tions among these  opinions,  their 
proper interpretation, and actions 
taken in the political  arena in re- 
sponse  to them. 
Analysts  have two interpretive 
choices  when  looking at this set of 
opinions,  and political actors have 
two behavioral choices.  Analyti- 
cally,  we  can put the absolute  num- 
bers in the foreground and the tra- 
jectory  in the background,  or vice 
versa.  That is, we  can focus  on the 
fact that middle-class  African 
Americans  still overwhelmingly  en- 
dorse the American dream and still 
believe  that it describes  their own 
lives,  and read the evidence  of de- 
clining belief  as a transient manifes- 
tation of opposition  to Reaganite 
conservatism,  relative deprivation, 
or fear of and for the urban under- 
class.  Alternatively,  we  can focus 
on the fact that the very  segment  of 
PS: Political Science & Politics  36 Middle-Class  African  Americans 
the population that seems  to em- 
body the continuing vitality  and 
efficacy of the American dream is 
leading the rest of the nation into 
disillusionment  and bitterness.  The 
former interpretation rests on the 
absolute  numbers; the latter inter- 
pretation rests on changes  in those 
numbers over time. 
Roughly the same two choices 
are available to political actors. 
They  can assume,  as President 
Clinton did in his campaign and as 
analysts  such as William J. Wilson 
and Charles Hamilton do, that the 
significance  of race really is declin- 
ing among the best-off blacks  in 
favor of class-related  issues  or lib- 
eral individualism (Wilson  1980; 
Hamilton  1993). President Clinton 
gambled successfully  on gaining 
enough support from black voters 
(who,  like white voters,  are dispro- 
portionately better off than nonvot- 
ers) by focusing  on economic  is- 
sues  of job security,  health 
insurance,  and deficit reduction 
rather than by invoking civil rights 
history or demands for racial eq- 
uity. 
Professor  Hamilton even  argues 
that the  1992 presidential election 
signaled the demise  of the racially 
structured presidential campaigns 
of the last 30 years.  Organizing pol- 
itics around race is no longer, he 
claims,  in the interests  of the Re- 
publican Party (chastened  by Willie 
Horton and David Duke),  the Dem- 
ocratic Party (able to win without 
it), or black elites  (sufficiently se- 
cure to move  beyond  racially based 
politics  to their other perennial 
concern  for social welfare  issues). 
Political actors may,  in short, judge 
that middle-class  African Ameri- 
cans'  overall continued  endorse- 
ment of the American dream and 
their confidence  in their own ability 
to succeed  according to its precepts 
is the real story,  and their growing 
skepticism  is either temporary or 
narrowly focused  on bounded con- 
cerns. 
Political actors may,  however, 
interpret public opinion differently. 
They may agree with Lani Guinier, 
Louis  Farrakhan, and Ben Chavis 
that race still determines what hap- 
pens even  to well-off  African 
Americans more than do class  or 
individual characteristics,  and that 
time is running out on blacks'  pa- 
tience with discrimination and stig- 
matization.  A shared focus  on race 
does  not lead to shared policy  goals 
or political strategies,  as a quick 
canvass  of the views  of these  three 
actors shows.  But these  actors are 
united in their claim that middle- 
class blacks  are still more black 
than middle class,  and in their in- 
sistence  that racially targeted poli- 
cies  are essential  if blacks  are ever 
to get,  and to believe  that they  are 
getting,  fair rewards for their ef- 
forts.  Put more schematically,  po- 
litical actors may judge that absent 
drastic action,  middle-class  African 
Americans'  growing skepticism 
about the American dream will 
.  .political  actors  may 
judge  that absent  drastic 
action,  middle-class 
African Americans' 
growing  skepticism  about 
the American  dream will 
eventually  overwhelm 
their historical faith 
in democracy  and 
opportunity, if it has 
not already done so. 
eventually  overwhelm  their histori- 
cal faith in democracy  and opportu- 
nity, if it has not already done so. 
Of course,  neither political actors 
nor analysts operate in a vacuum. 
The choices  of the former are con- 
strained by all of the things implied 
by the phrases  "socioeconomic 
context"  and "political structure"- 
ranging from multinational corpora- 
tions'  choices  about where  to lo- 
cate factories  to the arithmetic of 
single-member legislative  districts. 
The judgments of the latter are 
constrained by the quality and 
range of the data they rely on and 
by the assumptions  and commit- 
ments they bring to the interpreta- 
tion of those  data. Nevertheless, 
the great complexity  and fluidity of 
middle-class  African Americans' 
beliefs  about the American dream 
allow politicians  and analysts  as 
wide  an interpretative screen  and 
as much freedom of movement  as 
any person can cope  with. 
How will well-off African Ameri- 
cans respond,  in turn, to politi- 
cians'  actions  and analysts'  inter- 
pretations? (Anticipation of their 
responses  is,  of course,  one of the 
constraints faced by politicians  and 
analysts.)  I see  two possible  direc- 
tions,  corresponding  to the two sets 
of interpretative judgments  and po- 
litical choices  described  above. 
Middle-class  blacks may by now 
be sufficiently integrated, behavior- 
ally if not psychologically  and cul- 
turally, into mainstream (i.e., 
white-dominated)  society  that their 
faith in the American dream will 
over the long run be reinforced. 
After all, middle-class  African 
Americans  by definition (that is,  as 
I have defined them in my reanaly- 
ses  of the survey  data) are well  ed- 
ucated and have high incomes. 
Most also have white  collar jobs, 
live in comfortable  if not racially 
mixed neighborhoods,  and face no 
direct legal or behavioral barriers 
to further success.  They still 
mostly vote  for Democrats,  but 
surveys  show  that they are becom- 
ing more conservative  on economic 
and social welfare  policies  com- 
pared with poorer African Ameri- 
cans or with middle-class  African 
Americans  20 years  ago. They  have 
ample grounds therefore,  to put it 
schematically,  to trust their long- 
standing faith in the prescriptions 
of the American dream and to in- 
terpret their own  success  in its 
terms,  and eventually  to halt or 
reverse  their current disillusion- 
ment about its efficacy for other 
blacks  and nonblack Americans. 
(Their disillusionment  could halt or 
reverse  for either of two reasons- 
middle-class  African Americans 
could worry less  about poor blacks, 
thus coming to resemble well-off 
whites'  views  on poor whites,  or 
they could regain faith that other 
African Americans  will be able to 
succeed  as they themselves  have 
done.) 
However,  well-off  African Amer- 
icans'  disillusionment  may grow to 
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the point that it affects their general 
faith in the American dream and 
their confidence  about their own 
future. If middle-class  blacks feel 
betrayed by President Clinton's 
abandonment of Lani Guinier, if 
they fear that continued  recession 
threatens their own hard-won eco- 
nomic and social  standing, if they 
despair for the desperately  poor 
African Americans  trapped in nihil- 
istically violent  ghettos,  if they fear 
that their children will suffer the 
consequences  of the end of the 
"second  Reconstruction,"  if they 
cannot conquer or ignore persistent 
subtle racism in their work and 
neighborhoods-then  the recent 
changes  in their beliefs will affect 
even  those  aspects  of their belief 
that have not yet  crumbled. At 
worst,  most African Americans will 
come  to feel what some  now be- 
lieve,  that to succeed  on the terms 
set by the dominant ideology  is to 
go over to the enemy  and to betray 
one's  own. 
Sensitive  political actors under- 
stand this danger. Senator Brad- 
ley's  challenge  to then-President 
Bush and Professor  Guinier's insis- 
tence  that her goal is racial integra- 
tion and understanding stand out as 
evidence  that politicians  are able to 
recognize  that these  issues  are too 
serious for the politics  of electoral 
safety  or personal vengeance.  Pub- 
lic policies  may even be able to tip 
the balance of middle-class  African 
Americans'  allegiances  toward the 
American dream if political actors 
can figure out how to respond si- 
multaneously  to racial and class- 
based anxieties. 
Thus in this case  the interactions 
among opinion,  interpretation, and 
political action are not only more 
complicated  than we  usually real- 
ize-that  may be true of any inter- 
action worth attending to-but  also 
more fraught. Most media and pub- 
lic attention,  for good reason,  is 
devoted  to the small fraction of 
poor young men in large cities  who 
have lost faith in any personal mo- 
rality or social  constraints.  But at 
least some  attention should be de- 
voted  to the more subtle but poten- 
tially just as serious  loss  of faith 
among those who  seem  to exem- 
plify the American dream. It is one 
thing for jobless,  illiterate, destitute 
young men to lash out at the soci- 
ety that apparently finds them ex- 
pendable; it is quite another for 
professional,  well-educated,  well- 
paid men and women  to become 
embittered at the society  that ap- 
parently searches  for them eagerly. 
Middle-class  blacks  have succeeded 
beyond  the wildest  dreams of their 
grandparents; whites  hire them 
with an eagerness  beyond  the wild- 
est nightmares of some  of their 
grandparents. And yet  the survey 
data show  resentment,  fear for the 
future, anger. 
Are the surveys  right? Which 
aspect of the surveys  should hold 
our attention-the  absolute  num- 
bers or the changes  over time? Is 
my interpretation of the complex 
pattern of beliefs  tenable? Can po- 
litical actors respond? To which  set 
of beliefs  should they respond? Can 
their responses  make any differ- 
ences?  These  rhetorical questions 
need real answers,  both in order to 
address continuing problems of 
race in America  and to probe fur- 
ther the relationship of public opin- 
ion to political action. 
Notes 
1.  Results  are from my reanalyses  of the 
data collected  by Angus Campbell and 
Howard Schuman in "Racial Attitudes  in 
Fifteen  American Cities,"  and from unpub- 
lished tabulations of Louis  Harris and Asso- 
ciates  in "The Unfinished Agenda on Race 
in America."  The sample size  in the first 
study was  3,230 black residents  of cities;  the 
second  survey  included a random national 
sample of  197 African Americans. 
2.  Results  are from my reanalyses  of data 
from The Gallup Poll, August 27-30,  1971, 
and "The American Dream,"  conducted  by 
the Roper Organization for the Wall Street 
Journal,  1986. The first survey  sampled 275 
blacks; the second  included  106. 
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